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I. Introduction and Background    
  In 1996 the Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act 
(PRWORA) became law, eliminating the Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC) 
program.
1  In place of AFDC, states receive a block grant to establish a Temporary Assistance 
for Needy Families (TANF) program.  New rules under the TANF program impose stricter time 
limits and work requirements.  Once a TANF recipient is determined to be ‘job ready’ or she has 
received assistance for 24 months, she is required to work.
2  Under AFDC, relatively few 
recipients were required to work.  For example, the Job Opportunity and Basic Skills (JOBS) 
program, which TANF also replaced, required only about 10% of the AFDC caseload to 
participate.  But under TANF, there is pressure on the states to increase their work participation 
rates in order to receive their full block grant amount.  By 1999, states must have had at least 
35% of their mandatory TANF caseload participating in work activities for at least 25 hours (for 
all families) and 90% of their two-parent TANF families working 35 hours or more. 
  Due to the changes brought about by the PRWORA, an increasing number of individuals 
are required to find a job, some entering the labor force for the first time.  Many of these job 
seekers have a low skill level, little work experience, and other barriers to employment, such as 
transportation and child-care needs.
3   Most of the literature examining questions related to the 
transition from welfare to work focuses on employment barriers of former welfare recipients and 
the availability of jobs for former welfare recipients.  Few studies have examined the turnover 
                                                 
1 H.R. 3734, signed by President Clinton on August 22, 1996. 
2 The definition of work is left up to the states to define, and can include employment subsidized 
by the state.  Since most recipients are women, the pronoun she is used. 
3 See Zedlewski (1999), Deavers and Hattiangadi (1998) and Ong (1996) for a discussion of 
employment barriers facing welfare recipients. 
- 1 - behavior of former welfare recipients.
4  The fear of many employers is that welfare recipients are 
less stable (higher turnover) workers than non-welfare recipients.  And, high turnover is, of 
course, costly because of personnel processing, orientation, training, etc.   
  This paper utilizes unique, firm-level post-PRWORA data to examine the separation 
behavior of welfare and non-welfare hires and the effectiveness of a firm’s work programs on 
reducing turnover.  The following questions are addressed:  (1) Is the separation behavior of 
former welfare recipients, in fact, different from other workers?  If so, how and why does it 
differ? (2) What characteristics of a firm’s work program contribute to higher retention rates?  
(3) Does the time to separation vary by welfare status for different reasons for separating?  In 
other words, do welfare hires separate from their employer sooner than non-welfare hires for 
personal versus professional reasons?
 5   The answers to these questions have implications for 
firms’ hiring policies and the potential effectiveness of work programs.  By identifying factors 
contributing to higher retention rates, especially factors related to the type of work programs in 
place, more effective work programs can be designed.  After all, the determination of a 
successful welfare-to-work transition does not conclude merely when the individual finds 
employment. 
  Most likely due to the relatively new public policy interest in hiring welfare recipients, 
there are few studies which empirically examine the separation behavior of welfare hires.  
Whenever examined, turnover among welfare hires has uniformly been found to be high.  For 
example, Berg et al. (1992) find that 46 percent of recent welfare recipients lost or quit their job 
                                                 
4 Although the word welfare applies to many different public assistance programs that aid 
individuals or families based on need and means, welfare as used in this study means individuals 
or families receiving AFDC (or a successor program).  AFDC was the only means-tested 
program for families in which benefits were received in cash, not goods or services. For recent 
studies, see Gittleman (2000), Hofferth et al. (2000), Loprest (2000), and Ribar (2000). 
5 Workers who were laid off are not included in the study. 
- 2 - in the first three months of employment and 73 percent have lost or quit their job within one 
year.
6 Among factors that affect turnover rates among welfare hires, studies have found that 
turnover is reduced among welfare hires receiving higher wages and those employed in higher-
skilled jobs (for example, see Berg et al. 1990, Leete 1996, and Lane and Stevens 1995).  In 
addition, one study (Berg et al. 1992) has found that job loss among welfare hires was more 
likely for absenteeism, tardiness, and poor social skills, and not for poor physical skills or 
personal reasons.  None of the studies  compares the turnover rates among welfare hires with 
comparable non-welfare hires. The analysis in this paper makes use of data which allows for 
comparisons of turnover to be made between fairly homogenous welfare and non-welfare hires.  
The data also allow a comparison of the reason for job separation.  A number of key factors have 
been identified in the broader turnover literature that have proven to be important determinants 
of separation behavior.  This literature will help guide the structure of the empirical analysis that 
follows.
7   
  The results of the analyses indicate that the separation behavior of welfare hires is not 
remarkably different from non-welfare hires.  Welfare hires are found to be less likely to 
separate, staying on the job for approximately one week longer than non-welfare hires (evaluated 
at the median tenure).  Welfare hires are found to separate sooner for being fired for cause, and 
to separate later for personal or professional reasons.  To improve the retention of both welfare 
and non-welfare hires, mentoring programs were found to be the most effective type of work 
program. 
                                                 
6 Others finding high turnover rates among former welfare recipients include Berg et al (1990), 
Leete (1996), Eberts (1997), Lane and Stevens (1998), and Her et al (1995). 
7 Blau and Kahn (1981), Berg et al. (1992), Meitzen (1986), Sicherman (1996), Bartel (1982), 
and Weiss (1984) all provide good sources of factors that have found to be important in the 
determination of quit behavior. 
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II. Unique Data 
  The data used in this study are from the personnel records of a large, unionized firm in 
the transportation industry with numerous domestic and international locations. Since this firm 
mainly employs domestic workers and the welfare-to-work concept being studied applies only to 
the United States, the study is restricted to domestic workers.  Due to the numerous different job 
types this firm employs, the focus will be on one particular  type: part-time package sorters.  This 
part-time position typically involves working four to five hours a day, five days a week.
8  By 
focusing on one job type, this study provides for homogeneity in working conditions. This type 
of work often involves heavy lifting, repetitiveness, and working conditions with extreme 
temperatures depending on the weather.  Since this job requires a relatively low level of skill, 
this is a typical job that a welfare recipient would be able to obtain.  As Wolman (1996, 2) 
reports, “AFDC recipients have below average education levels and cognitive skills,” making 
them more likely to find jobs in the low-skill service sector and in light factory work.
9 
  The data set was constructed by querying the firm’s personnel records for all employees 
(of this job type) hired from January 1, 1998 to December 31, 1999. These employees were then 
matched with other personnel tables to obtain data on demographic characteristics, such as 
education and age, and job-related characteristics such as shift worked. The sample size is 
80,834, of which 5,026 are welfare hires.
10  Summary statistics (of selected variables), by type of 
                                                 
8 For information on hours worked by welfare recipients, see Brauner and Loprest (1999), Parrott 
(1998) and Loprest (2000). 
9 See Zill et al. (1991) also for types of jobs obtained by welfare recipients. 
10 To be classified as a welfare hire, the individual must meet the welfare criteria applicable to 
the Work Opportunity Tax Credit (WOTC).  Qualified AFDC recipients are any individuals who 
are members of a family receiving AFDC (or a successor program) for any nine months during 
- 4 - hire and censoring status, are presented in Table 2.
11  For a description of the variables, see Table 
1.  The separation percentage is four percentage points higher for non-welfare hires (61% vs. 
57%).  A form of the dependent variable in the duration model, tenure, indicates that the average 
tenure is longer for welfare hires by a few days (116 vs. 114 days).  (Note that 66% of welfare 
hires and 68% of non-welfare hires have tenure below the mean tenure reported for their welfare 
status category.) The average age of the welfare hires, 24, is one year younger than the average 
age of the non-welfare hires.  The average education level is similar for the two groups, differing 
by less than one year. The average hourly pay rate is almost identical for the two groups, which 
is expected since the job is a union job and both groups have similar tenure.  A larger percentage 
of the welfare hires are female and black. 
[Tables 1 and 2 here] 
  For welfare hires, 42% of the observations are censored (i.e., they did not separate prior 
to December 31, 1999) and 39% of the non-welfare hires are censored. Welfare and non-welfare 
hires which are not censored have relatively the same tenure, 47 days for non-welfare hires and 
46 days for welfare hires.  For censored observations, non-welfare hires have a slightly longer 
tenure, 218 days compared to 213 days.  The other variables remain relatively stable across 
censoring status within a given welfare status category. 
  When an employee voluntarily or involuntarily separates from her job, the company 
recorded the individual’s main reason for separating.  From the 53 different categories for  no 
longer being employed, three main categories were created:   professional reasons, personal 
reasons, and fired for cause.  Employees who were labeled as separating for professional reasons 
                                                                                                                                                             
the last 18 months, ending on the hiring date.  An outside agency hired by the firm identified 
which employees were welfare hires. 
11 Performing a t-test on the variables in Table 2 indicates that the means for the two groups are 
statistically different at a 5% significance level. 
- 5 - identified themselves, for example, as quitting to accept another job or because they were 
dissatisfied with a particular aspect of the job, such as pay, type of work, or hours.
12  Employees 
who were identified as separating for personal reasons cited reasons such as health, returning to 
school, or transportation problems.  Included in this category are individuals who did not show 
up voluntarily for work.  Separation due to being fired for cause includes employees who were 
terminated because they violated company policies.  The main reason for being fired for cause 
was due to having excessive absenteeism (68% of all reasons within this group were for 
excessive absenteeism).
  Table 3 reports reasons for separation, by welfare status.  The primary 
reason for non-welfare and welfare hires separating is due to personal reasons, with the 
percentage being relatively the same for both groups, about 58 percent.  Professional reasons 
follow as being the next reason for no longer being employed.  A larger percentage of non-
welfare hires cited this reason, 33 percent of non-welfare hires versus 24 percent of welfare 
hires.  Looking at the fired for cause category, a larger percentage of welfare hires were included 
in this category compared to non-welfare hires, 18 percent versus 10 percent.   
[Table 3 here] 
  Table 3 also lists the average tenure for each of the three reasons for separating, by 
welfare status.  Examining the average tenure of non-welfare hires by reason for separating, non-
welfare hires who separate for professional or personal reasons have the highest tenure at 48 
days, while non-welfare hires who separate for being fired for cause have an average tenure of 
42 days.  For welfare hires, average tenure is longest for employees separating for personal 
                                                 
12 Employees who were dissatisfied with a particular job aspect were grouped with individuals 
who quit to take another job since it is believed that the latter group quit in hopes of obtaining a 
better job.  Approximately 26% of non-welfare hires and 35% of welfare hires in the professional 
quit reason category were dissatisfied with an aspect of the job; the remaining 74% and 65%, 
respectively, quit to take a different job. 
- 6 - reasons (49 days), followed by professional reasons (45 days), and then fired for cause (38 days). 
 
III. Theory of Quit Behavior 
  This section applies a standard search model framework in which to examine the decision 
of a worker to quit his/her present job.  While the empirical section will model separations more 
generally, quitting is the predominant form of separation among these workers, and the 
theoretical model will identify how some key determinants of quit behavior can be expected to 
influence the individual level decision to separate from one's job. 
  The decision to stay at one’s present job, return to welfare, or to obtain another job can be 
viewed as maximizing the net present value of one’s expected utility over an infinite horizon.  
Utility, U(.), is assumed to be a function of money received in the form of income from working 
(I) or in the form of a public assistance subsidy (S), and leisure.  An individual is assumed to be 
currently working at job J1 and receiving income I1 and leisure equal to zero.
13  The decision 
facing the individual is whether to remain at her current job or to quit this job.  If she quits her 
job, she faces a probability p of obtaining a better job (job J2 with income I2 where E(I2) > E(I1)) 
and probability (1-p) of returning to welfare.  The utility received from returning to welfare is 
dependent upon how long the individual has received welfare relative to the state-specific time 
limit for receiving welfare.  If her time on welfare, tw, is less than the maximum welfare receipt 
time period in that state, she will receive the public assistance subsidy, S.  However, if she has 
already exceeded the maximum time allowable on welfare, tmax, she receives no subsidy.  Leisure 
is assumed to equal one if the individual returns to welfare.
14 
  Thus, the expected utilities are: 
                                                 
13 Available time has been normalized to equal one. 
14 For simplicity, the current analysis abstracts from the possibility of working while on welfare. 
- 7 -   EUt(don' t quit) = Ut(I1,0) (1) 
  EUt(quit)= ptUt(I2,0)+ (1 − pt)Ut(S,1) if tw < tmax   (2)  
  EUt(quit)= ptUt(I2,0)+ (1 − pt)Ut(0,1) if tw ≥ tmax    (3)  
where pt = probability of obtaining a better job, pt is contained in the interval [0,1] 
  t = time  
   = total time on welfare  tw
   = state-specific time limit for receiving welfare  tmax
  I1= income received from first job, job J1 
  I2  = income received from second job, job J2 
 S  = public assistance subsidy 
 
  The basic decision facing the worker is:  At what time is it optimal to quit her current 
job?  A simple search model can highlight some important potential determinants of this 
decision.
15  The assumptions of the model are: 
• A worker maximizes the expected value of utility, discounted to the present, over an 
infinite horizon. 
 
• The quality of a job is summarized by the wage rate. 
 
• Income while employed is constant (either I1 orI2). 
 
• S is constant as long as t .  w < tmax
 
• Value function, V(pt), is constant through time. 
 
• The possible outcome of a lower-paying job is not allowed for. (Presumably returning 
to welfare is preferable to a job paying less than I1 or the person would not have quit.) 
 
Thus, the problem is (for t ): w < tmax
16 
                                                 
15 The model that follows is the standard job search framework applied to the decision to quit 
one’s job.  Blau (1991) is a good reference for another application of this model. 
16 The assumption will be that t < tmax since individuals who have received welfare continuously 
since the reform was enacted will reach their lifetime limit in January 2001 (a date which is later 
than the last separation date in the data set). 
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max











    (4) 
where Ut = qt ptU(I2,0)+ (1 − pt)U(S,1) [] +(1− qt)U(I1,0), and qt =
1 if the worker quits





andpt, I1, I2, and S are defined above. εt is the disturbance term with a probability distribution, 
P(εt pt,qt), defined as: 
  qt = 0 ⇒Ut = U(I1,0); εt ~ F(.) 
  qt = 1⇒ pt = p 
 
The transition equation is: 
    pt+1 = εt. (5) 
The probability of finding a better job is equal to p with probability one if qt = 1, and it is a 
random draw from the distribution function F(.) if qt = 0. 
  The equation to be maximized is (see Bellman 1957): 
V(pt) =
qt∈{0,1}
max E{qt[ptU(I2,0)+ (1− pt)U(S,1)]+ (1−qt)U(I1,0)+ βV(εt| pt,qt)} (6) 
which can be written as choosing the maximum between two options, to quit or  not to quit one’s 
current job: 
V(pt)= max ptU(I2,0)+ (1 − pt)U(S,1)+ βEV (εt pt,1) [ ] {}  , U(I1,0)+ βEV (εt pt,0) [] { } [ ]  (7)   
This equation can also be written as: 
V(pt)= max ptU(I2,0)+ (1 − pt)U(S,1)+ βV(pt) {}  , U(I1,0)+ βEV { } []  (8)   
where:  
βEV = V(ε)dF(ε) and V(pt) = EV(εt pt,1) [] ∫ .   (9)  
If V(pt)= ptU(I2,0)+(1− pt)U(S,1)+ βV(pt), then: 
- 9 - V(pt)=
1
1− β
pt U(I2,0)−U(S,1) [] + U(S,1) {}    (10)  
so, 
V(pt)= max U(I1,0)+ βEV, 
1
1− β
















  (11)  


















0   1 
Thus, the optimal quitting rule is given by: 
 
If pt < pt
* ⇒  do not quit
If pt ≥ pt
* ⇒  quit
 
We also know: 
  U(I2,0)> U(I1,0)> U(S,1) >U(0,1) 
since utility is increasing in both income and leisure and I2 > I1 > S > 0. 
  Thus, when the value of quitting exceeds the value of not quitting (pt ≥ pt
*), the 
individual should quit her job.  Similarly, if the value of not quitting exceeds the value of 
quitting (pt < pt
*), she should not quit her current job.  An individual’s probability of obtaining a 
better job, p, relative to the probability that makes the value of not quitting equal to the value of 
quitting, p*, is one of the key factors in determining whether to quit or not to quit.  The values of 













  To derive the impact changes in S, I1, I2, or β have on p*, equation (11) can be written 
as:
17 
  V( =
1
1− β
p* U(I2,0)−U(S,1) [] + U(S,1) [  for p< p* ]  (12)   
and  
  V( =
1
1− β
pU(I2,0)− U(S,1) [] +U(S,1) [  for p ≥ p* ]  (13)   
Integrating  over p, simplifying, and solving for p*, we have: 
p





   (14)  
Assuming that p ~ uniform(0,1) implies that F(p*) = p* so that 
p*
∞







∫ = − p*2).  Therefore, an implicit function for p* can be defined as: 
H p*− 1,0)[1−β]−β[U(I2,0)−U(S,1)]p*2 −(1/2)β[U(I2,0)−U(S,1)][1− p*2]
[U(I2,0)−U(S,1)]
= 0 (15)   
which can be simplified to: 
H p*+ )β[1− p*2]−
U(I1,0)[1−β]
[U(I2,0)−U(S,1)]
= 0   (16)  





 < 0   (17)  
                                                 
17 Details can be found in Appendix A. 
18 Details can be found in Appendix A. 
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∂p*
∂I1








 > 0   (20)  
  A higher discount rate(β) applied to future earnings implies one will be more likely to 
quit because the (probability) point at which the value of quitting equals the value of not quitting 
has decreased.  Individuals who previously did not quit becausept < p*, now may find  pt > p* 
as they seek to “cash in” on the immediately higher income from job J2 (again, since both I1 and 
I2 are now more heavily discounted in the future). 
  A higher income in one’s current job (I1) will increase the reservation probability 
because now the current job is relatively more attractive. Holding all other variables constant, the 
probability level at which the value of quitting and not quitting is equal is now higher. 
Individuals now should be less likely to quit. 
  Higher earnings in the better job (if one quits) (I2) leads to a decrease in the reservation 
probability.  Thus, the difference between p and p* will decrease: individuals will be more likely 
to quit as expected earnings from obtaining a better job increase.   
  A higher subsidy (S) will increase the reservation probability.  A higher subsidy increases 
the y-intercept of the graph of V(pt) and also makes the slope flatter.  Thus, if pt equals zero (or 
is relatively small) and an individual quits, she can expect to earn S; however, if pt is relatively 
high, expected earnings in the future (taking into account there is probability pt of obtaining the 
better job and probability (1-pt) of receiving the subsidy) do not increase as quickly (due to the 
flatter slope).  At p*, she is indifferent between being at the current job and trying her luck by 
quitting (in which case she gets S or I2).  Since S has gone up, to have the expected value of 
- 12 - what an individual gets when she quits equal to the same constant number (I1 and its discounted 
income in the future), p* must go up so that (1-p*) goes down. I2 now receives a greater 
probability weight and S receives a lower probability weight.) 
  This operationalization of quit behavior indicates that welfare subsidies and earnings on 
the job will be important determinants of observed job separations.  Firm-specific human capital 
theory suggest that job tenure will also be important in determining job separations.  The longer 
an employee remains at her present place of employment, the more specific human capital she is 
likely to acquire, which increases productivity on the current job. Since her present employer is 
compensating her for her increased (specific) human capital, and other potential employers will 
not, it is in her interest to not quit her current job. 
  The job-matching theory  also predicts that tenure on the job will be related to separation 
behavior, but for different reasons (Jovanovic 1979a,b). Initially, when the worker begins the 
job, neither the firm nor the worker knows the quality of the job match.  Hence, the probability 
of quitting in the initial stages of employment is low.  As time on the job increases and the 
worker collects more information about the job match, such as information on working 
conditions, the worker evaluates her job match.
19 Poor matches are resolved by the worker 
quitting, while good matches result in the worker staying.  Thus, this theory predicts that the 
hazard of a job ending will initially be quite low, then increase as jobs deemed to be bad matches 
end, followed by a decrease in the hazard as the matches that continue are primarily good ones.
20    
  While the amount of specific human capital is not expected to differ across welfare and 
                                                 
19 Job match theory predicts good matches will receive higher wages and poor matches lower 
wages.  However, information about job match quality cannot come through wages as this job is 
covered by a union contract.   
20 For studies that examine the role matching has in the tenure-turnover relationship, see Lane 
and Parkin (1998) and Chapman and Southwick (1991).   
- 13 - non-welfare hires (since jobs held by both in this analysis are entry-level jobs), differential job-
matching may provide some explanation if separation behavior differs across welfare status.  
Welfare hires may have inferior job matches compared to non-welfare hires due to their 
(possibly) limited past employment experiences and the pressure to obtain a job quickly in order 
to comply with the new welfare requirements.  On the other hand, welfare hires may have better 
job matches (or bad matches but not act on them by ending the job) compared to non-welfare 
hires as they may face limited alternative job offers due to, perhaps, less experience and 
education.
21 
  The simple quit model, the theory of firm-specific human capital, and the job-matching 
theory suggest that a worker's wage, the size of the alternative welfare subsidy, and the length of 
time with the employer will be important determinants of job separations. 
 
IV. Empirical Analysis 
  While much attention has been focused on the ability of welfare recipients to find a job, 
little attention has been given to their turnover behavior.  The empirical analysis here is designed 
to answer three questions: (1) Is the separation behavior of former welfare recipients, in fact, 
different from other similar workers?  If so, how and why does it differ? (2) What types of a 
work program contributes to higher retention rates?  (3) Does the time to separation vary by 
welfare status for different reasons for separating? 
 
A. Time to Job Separation: A Survival Analysis  
  To explicitly address the issue of job duration or tenure, a survival model is estimated 
                                                 
21 This is an application of the theory of matching with job search developed by Jovanovic 
(1979a). 
- 14 - using the entire sample and also estimated separately by welfare status.
22   As presented in Cox 
and Oakes (1984) and Collett (1994), a proportional hazards model is commonly thought of as 
being comprised of two pieces, a baseline hazard in which all explanatory variables are zero, 
, and a function that takes on the values of the vector of explanatory variables,Ω h0(t) (Xi,β): 
  h(ti,X) = h0(ti)Ω(Xi,β),   (21)  
where Ω(Xi,β) is typically specified as exp(β1iX1i + β2iX2i + ...+ βkiXki).
 23 
  Assuming that the hazard h(ti,X) is continuous and constant over each interval [ , 
and that a specific regression model with a known distribution up to a vector parameter θ has 
been specified, the likelihood function can be considered to be made up of two pieces, depending 
on whether the observation is censored or not:
tj,t j+1]
24  
 lnL(θ X,t) = τiln f (ti Xi,θ)+ (1−τi)ln1− F(ti Xi,θ) [] { }
i=1
N
∑  (22)   
where τi= 1 if the observation is not censored (i.e., separates at time t or before) and τi= 0 if the 
observation is censored (i.e., stays beyond time t),  f (ti Xi,θ) is the probability density function 
of the random search duration, T, and F(ti Xi,θ) is the cumulative distribution function of T. 
  Following Kiefer (1988), the proportional hazard model (equation 21) can be translated 
into a linear accelerated failure time (AFT) model: 




'Welfarei + u1i  (23)  
                                                 
22 For other examples of the use of hazard functions to explore quit behavior, see Light and Ureta 
(1992), Meitzen (1986), and Sicherman (1996). 
23  See Cox and Oakes (1984), page 70.  The use of the exponential function imposes no 
restrictions on β due to the function's non-negativity. 
24 See Burdett and Cunningham (1998), Kiefer (1988), and Stata Corporation (1999, 2000).  The 
assumption is that censoring times are independent or fixed.  If no observations were censored, 
the likelihood function would simply be the joint probability distribution of the sample as a 
function of θ. 
- 15 - where α is the vector of coefficients to be estimated and   is the error term. The variables 
included in the model are based on data availability and the theoretical model:  The vector X
u1i
i 
consists of a set of personal characteristics, the vector Yi consists of a set of job-related 
characteristics, the vector Zi contains geographic-specific variables, and the dummy variable 
indicating welfare status is represented by the variable Welfare.  Welfarei equals one if the 
individual is a current or former welfare recipient and zero otherwise.  All variables contained in 
X, Y, and Z are described in Table 1. 
  Equation (23) can be estimated via MLE by assuming a distribution for u1i.  The 
preferred AFT model estimated is where u1i follows the generalized gamma distribution.
 25   The 
hazard function for the generalized gamma distribution is very flexible; nested within it are the 
log-normal model (K=0), Weibull model (K=1), and exponential model (K=1 and s=1).  
  The coefficients estimated for the full sample and by welfare status are reported in Table 
4.
 26  The first point of interest is that being a welfare hire reduces turnover (see column 1).  
Being a welfare hire increases median tenure by about seven days. A higher wage rate and being 
a student also have the effect of increasing median tenure, by 61 days and 25 days, 
respectively.
27  A higher state benefit also increases median tenure, but by a very small amount 
(a $10 increase in the state benefit increases median tenure by  about one day).  The positive 
impacts of the wage and sate benefit are consistent with the predictions of the theoretical model 
of quit behavior presented in the previous section.  All racial marginal effects are significant at 
                                                 
25 The model was estimated assuming a log-normal, log-logistic, weibull, and exponential 
distributions.  The generalized gamma was selected as the preferred model based on the Akaike 
Information Criterion (AIC).  The AIC for the gamma model is -243,904; -247,696 for the log-
normal; -248,424 for the log-logistic; -256,787 for the Weibull; -271,624 for the exponential.  
The conclusions did not change when different distributional assumptions were made. 
26 Note that a positive coefficient implies predicted tenure is extended. 
27 This positive impact of a higher wage on retention is consistent with other studies.  For 
example, see Berg et al. 1990, Leete 1996, and Lane and Stevens 1995. 
- 16 - the 90% level. Being a Hispanic increases median tenure by 8 days, while being Asian reduces 
median tenure by 25 days, being Native American reduces it by 10 days, and being white reduces 
it by five days (relative to blacks).  Females, older workers, and better-educated workers have the 
effect of reducing median tenure, as do individuals working the day shift.  Working the sunrise 
shift increases median tenure by 6 days.   
[Table 4 here] 
  Based on the estimated coefficients, and using the average characteristics by welfare 
status, the predicted tenure of welfare hires is 128 days, and for non-welfare hires it is 114 days.  
Thus, the average welfare hire stays 14 days longer than the average non-welfare hire. 
  Looking at the estimated marginal effects for welfare and non-welfare hires, a number of 
results stand out.
  Welfare hires appear to be more sensitive to changes in the wage rate.
28  This 
result suggests that firms have a powerful tool to lower quits among welfare hires (raise the 
wage).  If the wage is too low, welfare hires may see returning to welfare as a viable alternative, 
whereas non-welfare hires may not consider it.  In other words, there are a greater number of 
viable substitutes to this job for welfare hires, particularly, going back to welfare. 
  In addition, for a welfare hire to have an education beyond high school, there is no 
significant impact on the predicted time until separating, while for non-welfare hires it speeds up 
the time until separating.  The magnitude of several of the marginal effects is larger for welfare 
hires; in terms of the student variable, it possibly indicates that welfare hires place more value on 
the ability to be able to combine school and work, in the hopes that it will provide them with a 
better (economic) future.  While not statistically significantly different from zero, the impact of 
previous experience with this employer on time until separation is of interest.  Its impact on 
                                                 
28 The magnitude of the coefficient and marginal effect, however, should make us wary about 
predicting effects out of sample. 
- 17 - lengthening time until separation for non-welfare hires and speeding up time until separation for 
welfare hires suggests that non-welfare hires may be better able to take advantage of job match 
quality information gleaned from the earlier relationship.  Non-welfare hires also appear to be 
more sensitive than welfare hires to the shift of work and to the unemployment rate. 
 
B. The Influence of Work Programs on Separation Behavior 
  The firm being studied operates over 30 work programs throughout the United States, 
mainly in major cities.
29  The availability of these programs is not restricted to welfare hires, nor 
are they offered in all locations that hire welfare recipients.  The main program category types 
are:  mentoring programs, in which a more senior employee serves as a guide for the new hire 
(Mentor); school programs, in which high school or college classes are offered on-site, or at a 
reduced cost (School); work-related skills programs, in which basic job skill classes are available 
from local agencies (Work); and transportation programs, which provide the employee with 
reduced or free transportation to work (Transp). 
  To examine the impact particular program type availabilities have on the separation 
behavior of workers, equation (23) will be augmented to include dummy variables representing 
the type of work-related program available. Thus, equation (23) becomes: 
  ln(tenurei) =δ0 +δ1Xi +δ2Yi +δ3Zi +δ4Welfarei +δ5Mentori +  
                                                                       δ6Schooli +δ7Worki +δ8Transpi + µ2i (24)   
where the δ’s represent the parameters to be estimated; the vectors Xi, Yi, and Zi and the dummy 
variable Welfarei are as described for equation (23); Mentori, Schooli, Worki, and Transpi are the 
program availability dummy variables as described above; and  µ2i is the error term.  To focus on 
                                                 
29 Approximately 28% of the workers in this study have a work program available to them.  
- 18 - the program effects (and for brevity), equation (24) is estimated on the full sample only with the 
inclusion of interaction terms between welfare and the work program dummy variables to see if 
the programs have a differential impact by welfare status. 
  Table 5 presents the coefficients (and marginal effects) from estimating equation (24).  
Availability of mentoring programs do increase median tenure by 27 days, while all other 
program types reduce median tenure (work and school programs) or have no significant effect 
(transportation programs).  This provides a strong incentive for firms to actively match welfare 
hires with a mentor to improve stability. Interacting Welfare with the work program dummy 
variables indicates that these programs do not have a differential impact across welfare status.  
[Table 5 here] 
 
C. Types of Separation: A Competing RisksAnalysis 
  An individual may separate from his or her employer for a variety of reasons. In addition, 
separating due to absenteeism is most likely a very different way to end a spell of employment 
than is separating due to obtaining a different job.  A competing risks model is estimated to 
determine whether welfare hires separate from their jobs for systematically different reasons than 
non-welfare hires.  
  Grouping the reasons reported for no longer being employed, there are three distinct 
processes, identified by the index r:
30 
  r = 1  job ends due to personal reasons (NNW = 26,692; NW =1,686) 
  r = 2  job ends due to professional reasons (NNW = 15,051; NW =698) 
  r = 3  job ends due to firing for cause (NNW = 4,623; NW =517) 
                                                 
30 The subscript NW refers to non-welfare hires and W refers to welfare hires. 
- 19 -   Taking into account covariates and following Cox and Oakes (1984), the log likelihood 
function for the independent competing risks model is:
31 








∑    (25)  
where Sr is the survivor function for the rth reason for separating estimated in AFT metric (vs. 
the log-relative hazard metric of proportional hazard models); hr is the hazard function for the rth 
reason for separating estimated in AFT metric; ti represents observed tenure for the ith employee; 
dri is an indicator variable equal to one if individual i separates for reason r, 0 otherwise; and γi 
represents all of the explanatory variables included in equation (23).  Assuming independence 
amounts to assuming that unobservables that contribute to each type of separation are 
uncorrelated.
32 
  The results of the competing risks model are presented separately for welfare and non-
welfare hires in Table 6.  Being a welfare hire has a significant effect on time until separation for 
any reason (see notes to Table 6).  In particular, tenure is increased if the welfare hire separates 
for personal reasons.  That is, welfare hires tend to delay their time until separation for personal 
reasons.  In addition, welfare hires delay their time until separation for professional reasons and 
speed up their time until separation for being fired for cause.  The view that welfare recipients 
have many personal issues (child care, etc.) that interfere with their work is not substantiated by 
these results.  However, the result that welfare hires separate faster for being fired for cause 
                                                 
31 Where an individual is labeled as failing if r=ri , otherwise the individual is censored.  See 
Cox and Oakes (1984). 
32 Söderberg and Lyhagen (1999) propose an information matrix test for dependence between 
risks.  However, since only tenurei=min(tenureri) and di are observed, one cannot test the 
assumption of independence between tenure1, tenure2, and tenure3 (see Lawless 1982, 483).  The 
assumption of independence is commonly used in research; see Blank (1989), Blank and Ruggles 
(1994), and Addison and Portugal (1999).  For papers using a dependent competing risks 
framework, see Dolton and van der Klaauw (1999) and van Ophem and Jonker (1997). 
- 20 - suggests that firms may want to monitor the work behavior of welfare hires, such as their 
attendance.  These results are consistent with the job separation study of welfare hires by Berg et 
al. (1992).  It also suggests that it may take a welfare hire longer to find alternative job prospects.  
[Table 6 here] 
  Examining the impact the wage rate has on the predicted time until separation, welfare 
hires are again found to be more sensitive to changes in the wage rate.  In terms of the reason for 
separating, welfare hires who separate due to professional reasons are most sensitive to a change 
in the wage rate, while for non-welfare hires, individuals who separate due to being fired for 
cause are most sensitive to a change in the wage rate.   
  The greater than high school dummy variable is significant for non-welfare hires, but not 
for welfare hires.  Having greater than a high school education accelerates the time until 
separation for professional reasons and decelerates the time until separation for being fired for 
cause (for non-welfare hires).  Thus, non-welfare hires who have a high school education or 
beyond will be more likely to separate sooner, either because they found a different job or 
because they were dissatisfied with the job match. 
  Being a student delays the predicted time until separation for both welfare and non-
welfare hires, for all separation reasons.  Being a student has the largest impact on delaying the 
time until separation for professional reasons, for both welfare and non-welfare hires.  This result 
is expected since most students have fewer (better) job opportunities available to them, compared 
to individuals who have completed their education. 
  Calculating the predicted tenure for welfare hires and non-welfare hires (evaluated at 
sample averages), by reason for separating, indicates that the average welfare hire is predicted to 
stay on the job for 50 days if the reason for separation is professional.  The average non-welfare 
- 21 - hire is estimated to stay on the job for 34 days if the reason for separating is professional. 
Looking at personal reasons for separating, the average non-welfare hire’s predicted tenure is 
found to be 84 days; for welfare hires it is 97 days.  The predicted tenure for being fired for 
cause for a welfare hire is 703 days, and for an average non-welfare hire it is 1,293 days.
33  Thus, 
an average welfare hire’s tenure is predicted to be longer than an average non-welfare hire’s 
tenure if the reason for separating is professional or personal, and shorter if the reason for is due 
to being fired for cause.  
 
V.  Summary and Conclusions 
  This paper looks beyond the probability of welfare recipients finding employment; it 
focuses on the post-hiring behavior of the welfare recipient and how it compares to the behavior 
of the non-welfare hire.  The results both confirm some earlier findings and provide new insight 
as to the stability of welfare hires.  In particular, a survival analysis finds that welfare hires stay 
on the job longer than non-welfare hires.  At the median tenure, the difference in time until 
separation may seem relatively small (7 days), but it nevertheless may dispels the idea that 
welfare hires are unstable workers.  
  Additionally, welfare hire separations were found to be more sensitive to the wage rate 
than non-welfare hire separations.  If the goal is to increase the retention of welfare hires, 
increasing the wage rate would be an effective tool; states might consider supplementing the 
wages of welfare hires directly instead of providing tax credits to the firms hiring them.  It also 
appears as though welfare hire separations are not as sensitive to the shift work as non-welfare 
hire separations, suggesting firms need not be concerned to which shift they assign welfare hires. 
                                                 
33 The predicted values for the tenure of being fired for cause should be read with caution.  The 
log likelihood value for this model was much lower than for the other reasons for quitting. 
- 22 -   The presence of mentoring programs seems to be of particular importance for lengthening 
all worker’s time to separation.  Work and school programs may not directly work in the firm’s 
interest by reducing turnover; however, they could be increasing the general human capital of 
these employees. The various types of work programs do not have a differential effect on welfare 
hires, suggesting that these programs are not targeted exclusively to meet the needs of welfare 
hires, or that welfare hires benefit from the programs by as much as non-welfare hires.  
  Lastly, the results from a competing risks analysis indicate that welfare hires are not 
separating for personal reasons at an accelerated rate, compared to non-welfare hires. However, 
they are separating at an accelerated rate for being fired for cause, and at a slower rate for 
professional reasons.  So, while it may be important to provide for the child care and other 
personal concerns of welfare recipients to get them into a job, once these issues have been 
addressed (and the welfare hire is in a job), personal matters do not impact on a welfare hire's 
separation decision any more than that of a non-welfare hire. 
  While the results from this study of separation behavior of welfare hires at one firm may 
or may not be applicable to the population as a whole, this analysis has been able to provide 
important new insight on a number of questions: (1)  welfare hires are not any less stable (and in 
fact stay slightly longer on the job) than non-welfare hires; (2) the wage level turns out to be the 
most important factor in determining the time before separation, and is even a stronger 
determinant for welfare hires than for non-welfare hires; (3) mentoring programs are the best use 
of resources in lengthening time to separation; and (4) welfare hires do not separate faster for 
personal reasons, but they do separate faster for being fired for cause, and separate slower for 
professional reasons. 
- 23 - Table 1:  List of Variable Descriptions 
 
Variable Name  Description 




Married  =1 if individual’s marital status recorded as married; 0 otherwise  
(single-divorced is excluded group) 
 
Age  individual’s age as of June 1999 
 
Greater than High School  =1 if individual has education greater than high school; 0 otherwise 
 
Student  =1 if individual is recorded as being a student; 0 otherwise 
 
Vet-Handicapped  =1 if individual is recorded as being handicapped or a veteran; 0 otherwise 
 
Female  =1 if female; 0 otherwise 
 
Hispanic  =1 if individual is of Hispanic race; 0 otherwise  
(excluded racial dummy is Black) 
 
Asian  =1 if individual is of Asian race; 0 otherwise 
 
Native American  =1 if individual is of Native American race; 0 otherwise 
 





Wage Rate  hourly wage rate 
 
Previous Experience  =1 if individual recorded as working at company before; 0 otherwise 
 
Sunrise  =1 if individual works sunrise (early AM) shift; 0 otherwise  
(twilight--approx. 5 PM –8 PM-- is excluded shift)  
 
Night  =1 if individual works night shift (approx. 10 PM – 1 AM); 0 otherwise 
 
Day  =1 if individual works day shift (approx. 11 AM – 2 PM); 0 otherwise 
 
Volume  =volume sorted at location individual works, in 000’s  




High UR  =1 if unemployment rate for month individual started working is greater than 8%; 0 
otherwise 
 
State benefit  State welfare benefit for a single mother of two children, as of 1997 
- 24 -  
Work Training Programs 
 
 
Mentor  =1 if facility provides a mentoring program; 0 otherwise 
 
Transp  =1 if facility provides free or reduced-cost transportation; 0 otherwise 
 
Work  =1 if facility provides work-related skills training; 0 otherwise 
 
School  =1 if facility provides high school or college classes on-site or at a reduced cost; 0 
otherwise 
 




- 25 - Table 2:  Means of Selected Variables, by Censoring and Welfare Status 
 













































Disabled or a Veteran (%)  9 
 
 
4 7 4 
Student (%)  21 
 
22 34 33 
% Female  19 
 
46 20 44 
% White  37 
 
15 36 13 
% Black  49 
 
72   47  68 
NOBS 46,366  2,901  29,442  2,125 




- 26 - Table 3:  Reasons for Separating 
 
  Non-Welfare Hires Welfare Hires 






























NOBS – Total  46,366   2,901 
Note: For tenure, standard deviation is in parenthesis and minimums and maximums are in 
brackets. For NOBS, the percent of classification is in parenthesis. 
 
- 27 - Table 4:  Coefficients and Marginal Effects from Survival Model: Time to Separation 
 
Variable  Full Sample  Non-Welfare Hires  Welfare Hires 
Wage rate  0.701*** 
 (0.019) 
[60.52] 
0.696 ***  
(0.019) 
[59.58] 




Age  -0.078 ***  
(0.006) 
[-6.74] 
-0.080 ***  
(0.006) 
[-6.82] 




Age squared  0.001 ***  
(0.000) 
[0.10] 

















Greater than High School  -0.026 *  
(0.014) 
[-2.20] 







Student  0.268 ***  
(0.017) 
[24.79] 
0.269 ***  
(0.017) 
[24.60] 














Female  -0.106 ***  
(0.017) 
[-8.84] 
-0.103 ***  
(0.018) 
[-8.53] 




Hispanic  0.085 ***  
(0.023) 
[7.56] 










-0.321 ***  
(0.048) 
[-23.67] 




Native American  -0.122 *  
(0.073) 
[-9.95] 







White  -0.051 ***  
(0.015) 
[-4.34] 
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Sunrise  0.069 **  
(0.033) 
[6.18] 







Night  -0.092 ***  
(0.015) 
[-7.82] 







Day  -0.055 ***  
(0.021) 
[-4.64] 







Volume 1.5x10-5  ***   
(0.000) 
[0.001] 
1.5x10-5 ***  
(0.000) 
[0.00] 










































Constant  -1.614 ***  
(0.177) 
-1.530 ***  
(0.181) 
-64.542 ***  
(3.310) 
 
Predicted Mean Tenure 
(days) 
 114  128 
Log-likelihood -121976.28  -114624.04  -7208.574 
 
No. Observations  80,834  75,808  5,026 
Notes: Standard errors are in parenthesis.  Marginal effects are in brackets; they are evaluated at the 
median tenure.  Standard errors for the marginal effects are available from the authors, but indicated 
levels of significance match those of the parameter coefficients. *** indicates significant at the 99% level; 
** indicates significant at the 95% level; * indicates significant at the 90% level. 
- 29 - Table 5:  Coefficients and Marginal Effect from Survival Model with Work Program-Specific 
Dummy Variables 
 
Variable  Coefficient Estimates  Marginal Effects 











































































Volume 2.7x10-5***    0.0023*** 
- 30 - (1.6x10-6) (0.0001) 
 























































Married -0.027   





Constant -1.574***   
(0.176) 
 
Log-likelihood -121841.15   
NOBS=80,834.  Standard errors are in parenthesis.  *** indicates significant at the 99% level; 
** indicates significant at the 95% level; * indicates significant at the 90% level.  Marginal effects are 
evaluated at the median tenure. 
- 31 -  Table 6:  Coefficients and Marginal Effects from Competing Risks Model: Separation Type 
 
 Non-welfare  Hires Welfare  Hires 
 
Variable Personal  Professional Fired  for 
Cause 
Personal Professional Fired  for 
Cause 














































































































































































































































































































































































































Log-likelihood  -80635.226 -53947.563 -21534.854 
 







84 34  1,293  97 50  703 
 
NOBS Failed   26,692  15,051  4,623  1,686  698  517 
Notes: Dependent variable is log tenure.  NOBS=80,834.  Standard errors are in parenthesis, marginal 
effects are in brackets; they are evaluated at the median tenure.  *** indicates significant at the 99% level; 
** indicates significant at the 95% level; * indicates significant at the 90% level.  Results from the 
competing risk model estimated on the full sample re available from the authors.  In that estimation the 
coefficient [and marginal effect] on the welfare dummy variable are: 0.133*** [12.02] for Personal, 
0.219*** [20.52] for Professional, and -0.300*** [-22.48] for Fired for Cause. 
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- 37 - Appendix A: Intermediate Steps for Quit Theory 
Derivation of Equations (12) and (13): 
Equation (11) can be written as: 
  V(pt)= U(I1,0)+ βEV if p < p* (A1)   
and 
  V(pt)= 1/(1− β)[U(I2,0)− U(S,1)]pt +1/(1− β)U(S,1) if p ≥ p* (A2)   
At p*, equations (A1) and (A2) are equal: 
  U(I1,0)+ βEV = 1/(1− β)[U(I2,0)− U(S,1)]p*+1/(1− β)U(S,1) (A3)   
Solving for p*, the intermediary steps are: 
  1/(1− β){[U(I2,0)− U(S,1)]p*+U(S,1)}= U(I1,0)+ βEV (A4)   
  [U(I2,0)−U(S,1)]p*+U(S,1) =[U(I1,0)+ βEV][1− β] (A5)   
  [U(I2,0)−U(S,1)]p* =[U(I1,0)+ βEV][1− β]− U(S,1) (A6)   
Thus, 
  p* =
[U(I1,0)+ βEV][1− β]− U(S,1)
[U(I2,0)−U(S,1)]
   (A7)  
which can be re-written as:  
  p* =
[U(I1,0)][1− β]+ βEV[1− β]−U(S,1)
[U(I2,0)−U(S,1)]
   (A8)  
Using this expression for p* and equation (A3), equations (A1) and (A2) are modified to 
yield equations (12) and (13) in the text. 
 
Details of Integrating Equations (12) and (13) over p: 
Integrating equations (12) and (13) over p , we have: 







- 1 -                                                                                               
   (A9)   pdF(p)
p*
∞




Which simplifies to: 






∫    (A10)  
Substituting (1-β)EV from equation (A10) into equation (A8), we have: 
p* ={U(I1,0)[1− β]+ β{[U(I2,0)−U(S,1)]p*F(p*) +[U(I2,0)− U(S,1)] pdF(p)
p*
∞
∫ +  
                                                             U(S,1) dF(p)}−U(S,1)}/[U(I2,0)−U(S,1)]
0
∞
∫    (A11)  










  (A12) 
which is equation (14) in the text. 
 
Derivation of the Partial Derivatives: 






 where x = I1,I2,S,β {} .  Taking the 
derivative of H (equation 16 in the text) with respect to p*, we have: 
  Hp* = 1+ βp*>0 (A13)   
which is greater than zero since the range of p* is [0,1] and β > 0 
Next, taking the derivative of H with respect to β, we obtain: 




> 0  (A14)  
- 2 - which is greater than zero since the range of p* is [0,1] and U(I2,0) > U(S,1) and 
U(I1,0) > 0. 
Now, taking the derivative of H with respect to I1: 
  HI1 =
−(1 −β)UI1
[U(I2,0)− U(S,1)]
 < 0   (A15)  




which is less than zero since U(I2,0) > U(S,1), U  > 0, and β >0.  I1
Looking at the derivative of H with respect to I2: 
  HI2 =
U(I1,0)[1− β]UI2
[U(I2,0)−U(S,1)]
2  > 0  (A16)  
where U  refers to  I2
∂U
∂I2
, which is greater than zero since  U > 0, β > 0, and U(I I2 1,0) > 0. 
 
Finally, the derivative of H with respect to S: 
 
  HS =
−U(I1,0)[1− β]US
[U(I2,0)− U(S,1)]
2  < 0  (A17)  
 
which is less than zero because US > 0, β > 0, and U(I1,0) > 0. 
 
 
In summary, we found: 
 
  Hp* > 0 from equation (A13)  
  Hβ > 0 from equation (A14)  
  HI1< 0 from equation (A15)  
  HI2> 0 from equation (A16)  
  HS < 0 from equation (A17)  
  
This signage leads to the partial derivatives in equations 17-20 in the text. 
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